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Abstract: Baumgarten is perhaps the first phi-
losopher to approach the problem of the obscure 
representations of the soul aiming at discerning 
in them not obscurity or irrationality, rather a 
new clarity and hence a new perspective towards 
a better cognition of the human soul. The objec-
tive of this article is to verify how Baumgarten 
achieves this; namely, by understanding how the 
philosopher inscribes obscure representations, the 
“ground of the soul”, within empirical psychol-
ogy, and hence within metaphysics, as a topic 
of an aesthetic order; by identifying that which, 
according to Baumgarten, is the problem inherent 
to obscure representations, between the necessary 
and the impossible exteriorization (chiaroscuro) 
of the latter, and to attempt to discern Baumgar-
ten’s solution for this dilemma, which is to be 
found in the conscious-unconscious sfumato of 
poetry and is occasioned by the inherent poeticity 
of obscure representations themselves.
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Resumo: Baumgarten será porventura o primeiro 
filósofo a abordar o problema das representações 
obscuras da alma tendo em vista nelas discernir 
algo que não obscuridade, ou irracionalidade, 
antes nova claridade e, portanto, uma nova pers-
pectiva para o conhecimento da alma humana. O 
objectivo deste ensaio é verificar como Baum-
garten faz isto; a saber, perceber como o filósofo 
institui as representações obscuras, “fundo da 
alma” humana, no seio da psicologia empírica, e 
portanto da metafísica, enquanto tópico de ordem 
estética; identificar aquele que, para Baumgarten, 
é o problema inerente às representações obscu-
ras, entre a necessária e a impossível exteriori-
zação (chiaroscuro) das mesmas, e procurar ver a 
solução baumgartneriana para este dilema, a qual 
se encontra num sfumato consciente-inconsciente 
próprio da poesia, e é suscitado pela própria poe-
ticidade das representações obscuras.
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I. Baumgarten, re-writer of the history of obscure representations as a philosophical 
problem
Among its akin topics, which from the 17th century onwards begin to be considered as 
pertinent questions now in the field of Psychology, now in the field of Philosophy, Anthro-
pology and Aesthetics – namely, the so-called imaginative faculties of the human spirit, 
such as memory, fantasy, wit or genius – the topic of obscure representations is surely that 
which stands out for the least favorable reasons. For, despite its being a real topic; despite 
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its being a topic which has its role in the human formation of concepts; and hence, despite 
its pertinence, even for the superior powers of the spirit, nonetheless the question of obs-
cure representations was the latest and most reluctantly acknowledged of all such topics1. 
As a proof of this, well beyond the 18th century many had not yet acknowledged its former 
attributes, nor the topic itself as a noteworthy problem, and this quite simply because, 
throughout most of its existence as a philosophical problem, obscure representations were 
not even ascribed existence as such2.
The reasons for such a phenomenon are of a varied nature. Because the detailed expla-
nation of such reasons would by itself occupy several articles like this one, we shall tacitly 
omit it, and add but some general annotations on the topic’s history. The most extreme form 
of this phenomenon, the total negation of the topic, has ancestral roots which are due not 
exactly to the topic itself, but to its dark tonality, which was always connoted with igno-
rance, dubiousness, obscurity, even evil: in a word, negativity; something which therefore 
almost unconsciously led to the topic’s discredit and negation. This, we believe, is not 
only the oldest, but also the most lasting motive why the topic was neglected as a topic of 
importance to the study of human consciousness. Until the onset of the 18th century, with 
exception of sporadic, but never topicalizing references, obscure representations do not 
exist as a problem of philosophical pertinence, they are altogether negated, and hence are 
left unmentioned by philosophy and science in general. Even later, when the topic begins to 
1 For the sake of completeness, let it be stated that, by Baumgarten’s time, the remaining topics were long 
acknowledged as inferior powers or elements of the soul, and hence duly inscribed as philosophical-psycho-
logical-anthropological problems. Memory and imagination (or fantasy), usually considered hand in hand, had 
long been the object of attention by anthropology, psychology or philosophical manuals; the concept of genius 
(Genie, génie, genio, génio), drawn from the ancestral double stem of genius and ingenium (gigno), was long 
considered in either of its two definitions and was finally coined in its modern designation from the 17th century 
onwards, by the hands of Huarte, Rabelais, Gracián, Milton or Young; as to the term wit (Witz, esprit, ingenio, 
engenho), it has a very long and heterogeneous history, ever since Old High German, and, just like genius, it 
was consolidated into its final, more inventive connotation from the 17th century and the 18th century onwards, 
respectively in England, by the hands of Bacon, Hobbes and Locke, and in Germany, by the hands of Bodmer, 
Breitinger, Baumgarten himself and Kant. 
2 Such a fact is easily verifiable as an omission, which may be noted upon consulting the first modern works 
of an anthropological, psychological or philosophical nature, be they, as they were in the first decades of the 
modern formation of such fields of knowledge, of a physiological-anthropological, an empirical-psychological, 
a medicinal-anthropological or a pneumatological order. Namely, Magnus Hundt’s Anthropologium de Homi-
nis Dignitate, Natura et proprietatibus, de elementis, partibus et membris humani corporis (1501), though it 
includes an analysis of the properties of the human soul, makes no mention of obscure representations; nor does 
Otto Casmann’s Psychologia anthropologica, sive animae humanae doctrina (1594), or Sigismundus Evenius’ 
Disputationes Anthropologicae (1613), or Albert Kyper’s Anthropologia corporis humani contentorum, et 
animae naturam et virtutes secundum circularem sanguinis motum explicans (1647), or even Johann Sperling’s 
Synopsis Anthropologiae physicae (1659). And even later anthropological treatises, much more intertwined 
with empirical psychology than with physiology (as were the latter), still do not mention the topic of obscure 
representations. The proof of this are Edward Reynolds’ A Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soule of 
Man (1647), John Mason’s A Treatise of Self-Knowledge (1746) or Giuseppe Gorini Corio’s L’uomo. Trattato 
fisico morale diviso in tre libri (1756). Only in the 18th century, through the efforts of Locke, Leibniz, Wolff, 
Sulzer, Reimarus, Meier, Baumgarten and Kant, among others, will the topic of obscure representations be 
given due visibility and pertinence. 
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be accepted as real – which is brought about by Locke3 and Leibniz4 – it is formulated not 
in the sense of a true reflection on the topic itself, but with the aim to ascertain its causes 
and negative consequences; the causes, so as to identify that which, in such incomplete and 
confused representations, has ascribed them such an imperfect being, and the consequences, 
so as to think of possible solutions towards eradicating this inferior stratum of human cog-
nition. Even in Wolff’s5, and then Rüdiger’s6 and Knutzen’s7 view of it – views which no 
doubt accept the reality of the topic and inscribe it, though still by omission, in the theory 
of consciousness – the problem of obscure representations is not yet centered on the obscure 
representations as such, rather on what they allow one to cognize, on what they contain of 
human knowledge, or lack thereof (with special focus on the latter); namely, if, upon their 
perception, they arise before or after our consciousness of things, and not as that which 
indeed forms things in human consciousness, thereby underscoring a possible importance of 
obscure representations in the constitution of the subjectivity of the imaginative I. And lastly, 
even after these debates, around the transition from the 18th century to the 19th century, it is 
evident that the topic of obscure representations, though widely accepted, is not yet a topic 
of importance, rather it is held as a mere appendix for other questions – something which, 
in all fairness, is still quite visible even today8.
3 See Locke, John (1824), An Essay concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chap. XXIX (W I: 383-393).
4 See Leibniz, G.W. (1873), Neue Abhandlungen über den menschlichen Verstand, Buch II, Kap. XXIX (NAMV: 
255-266)
5 See Wolff, Christian (1738), Psychologia Empirica, Pars I, Sectio II, Caput I “De differentia perceptionum 
formali” (GW II.5: 20-33).
6 See Rüdiger, Andreas Johannes (1727), “Meynung von den Wesen der Seele”, written as a reply not to Wolff’s 
position on obscure representations in the Psychologia Empirica, but to his position on the topic as expressed 
in his Vernünfftigen Gedancken von Gott, der Welt, und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt 
(1719).
7 See Knutzen, Martin (1741, 1744), Philosophische Abhandlung von der immateriellen Natur der Seele, written 
as a reply to Rüdiger’s position on the topic.
8 The best proof of this is on the one hand the scarce number of works which to this day have approached the 
history, focus or philosophical pertinence of the topic of obscure representations in any author; on the other 
hand, and even more so, the apparent indifference with which such a topic was welcomed even in the scope 
of the work of an author who has changed the history, focus and philosophical status of the topic of obscure 
representations, such as Baumgarten. There are, however, a few notable exceptions in both cases. As to the first, 
we would mention: GIORDANETTI, Piero, POZZO, Riccardo, SGARBI, Marco (eds.), Kant’s Philosophy of 
the Unconscious, Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2012; LA ROCCA, Claudio, “Der Dunkle Verstand: Unbe-
wusste Vorstellungen und Selbstbewusstsein bei Kant”, in Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Akten 
des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Berlin/Boston: de Gruyter, Editors: Valerio Rohden, Ricardo R. Terra, 
Guido A. de Almeida, Margit Ruffing, 2008, pp.457-468. DECULTOT, Elisabeth, “Die Schattenseiten der 
Seele: Zu Johann Georg Sulzers Theorie der dunklen Vorstellungen”. éd. par Hans Adler et Rainer Godel. For-
men des Nichtwissens der Aufklärung, Halle, Germany. pp.263-278, 2010; WUNDERLICH, Falk, Kant und die 
Bewusstseinstheorien des 18. Jahrhunderts, Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2005. As to the second, we would 
mention: ADLER, Hans (1988),”Fundus animae – der Grund der Seele. Zur Gnoseologie des Dunklen in der 
Aufklärung“, in: Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 62, S. 197-
220; LA ROCCA, Claudio, “Das Schöne und der Schatten. Dunkle Vorstellungen und ästhetische Erfahrung 
zwischen Baumgarten und Kant”, in Im Schatten des Schönen. Die Ästhetik des Häßlichen in historischen 
Ansätzen und aktuellen Debatten, hrsg. von Heiner F. Klemme, Michael Pauen,Marie-Luise Raters, Bielefeld: 
Aisthesis Verlag, 2006; OBERHAUSEN, Michael (2002), ”Dunkle Vorstellungen als Thema von Kants Anthro-
pologie und A. G. Baumgartens Psychologie“ , in: Aufklärung, 14, S. 123-146. 
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One of the authors – perhaps the author – who emerges from this bleak history precisely 
for the opposite reasons, is Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten; he who, unlike so many of his 
contemporaries, would discern in the obscure representations of the soul – precisely in their 
obscurity, in their sensibility – a new and very important plane of cognition of human cons-
ciousness, and a new stratum of the subjectivity of the imagining I. In this sense, Baumgarten 
is the author who, until Kant and his Lectures on Anthropology (1772-1789), discerns the 
greatest and best potentialities in obscure representations and in the obscurity of the human 
soul. To consider how Baumgarten does this, and to ascertain which new potentialities these 
are, such is the main objective of this article. A main objective which we hereby divide into 
two secondary objectives, which could be enunciated as follows:
1) First, to attempt to discern the contours of the revolution to which Baumgarten sub-
mits the topic of obscure representations, and alongside this topic, and through this topic, 
the whole status of sensible cognition. At the same time, we intend to see to what extent 
Baumgarten does this in favor of a clearer delimitation of the fields of Empirical Psychology 
and the Aesthetics, within Metaphysics.
2) Lastly, we propose to analyze the dilemma which underlies a possible positivity – a 
truth – of obscure representations. Through this we shall attempt to understand the problem 
of a simultaneous necessity, and yet impossibility of such a truth, and the (double) role of 
poetry in untying such a Gordian knot. 
II. Obscure representations: their real existence as “the ground of the soul”
At first sight, and just like other authors, Baumgarten does not seem to approach the 
question of obscure representations very thoroughly, or even expressly, as a question as such. 
The topic arises without exception as a complement, or an appendix to other topics, namely, 
as a proof of the “Reality of the soul”, in his Metaphysik (1739), between the sections on 
“The aesthetic truth” and “The aesthetic falsehood” in his Ästhetik (1750-1758), or in direct 
relation with poetry, in his “Meditationes philosophicae de Nunullis ad poema pertinentibus” 
(1735). In compensation, the topic is patently recurrent in Baumgarten’s works, and is inva-
riably inscribed in the previous different, yet interrelated theoretical frameworks.
Taking as a starting point the Metaphysik, §§ 510-518, Baumgarten’s considerations on 
obscure representations seem to exemplify the veiled importance of the topic. Indeed, if one 
considers § 510, one concludes that it could have been extracted from any other researcher 
of the topic, inasmuch as there, as in other authors, obscure representations are presented 
as minor representations, and their knowledge as inferior, when compared to that of clear 
representations: “Hence, under equal presuppositions, a clear cognition is greater than an 
obscure one. And so, obscurity signifies a lesser degree of cognition, clarity a greater one” 
(Metaphysik: 9)9. Namely, just as Leibniz, Rüdiger, Knutzen and others before him, Baum-
garten dissociates obscure from clear representations, by saying that obscure representations 
9 Due to reasons of a greater completeness, which could not be present in the first edition of the Metaphysik 
(1739), this citation, as well as the one in annotation 15 of this article, are extracted from the text of the seventh 
edition of the same work, dated 1779, as it is found in BAUMGARTEN, Alexander Gottlieb, Texte zur Grundle-
gung der Ästhetik, hrsg. von Hans Rudolf Schweizer, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2013, pp. 1-66, and therefore 
shall be identified differently, as Metaphysik (See bibliographical references).
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are characterized insofar as their attributes are not distinguishable, they are confuse and 
generate confuse thinking; clear ones, quite conversely, by the exact opposite of this. And 
so, it is indeed an incontrovertible necessity that obscure representations come to clarity; but, 
as it seems, this is necessary only because, until such clarification takes place, nothing may 
be discerned in obscure representations apart from incompleteness, inanity and obscurity, 
which renders them the last stratum of the inferior powers of cognition – almost as low, 
one could say, as sensibility.
However, §§ 511 and 514, while not contradicting10, completely alter this vision, and 
elevate the topic of obscure representations to a whole different condition – one which 
henceforth, and not just in Baumgarten, would be its own. Immediately prior to these §§, 
then, Baumgarten seems to designate obscure representations as the lowest state of human 
cognition; that is, obscure representations are herein described as being the least active, and 
hence least influent of the elements which compose the power of human imagination. From § 
511 onwards, however, obscure representations are no longer presented in such terms, rather 
in new, unheard-of terms; in Baumgarten’s own words: “There are obscure representations in 
the soul” (Met.: 118)11, and “The sum of which will be designated as the ground of the soul 
(FUNDUS ANIMAE)” (id.)12. Namely, according to Baumgarten, there are indeed obscure 
representations in the human soul – “There are (…) obscure representations” (ibid.) – and 
this fact is beyond any doubt, as is for Baumgarten their role in human consciousness. But 
furthermore, not only is there such a thing as obscure representations, but they are “the 
ground of the soul [FUNDUS ANIMAE]” (ibid.): a statement which therefore is not depleted 
in its declaration of existence, rather forces us to see the existence of obscure representations 
with different eyes, in what is to be taken as a true shift in the paradigm of their vision. 
For if we know that obscure representations exist – despite their attribute of confusion and 
obscurity, and our unawareness of them – and if we know that they are the “ground of the 
soul” (ibid.), that is because, according to Baumgarten, the obscure representation no longer 
can be, as it was before, a representation viewed in its isolation, which in that same isolation, 
must generate a clear one; nor is it therefore the last of the human powers of cognition. Quite 
on the contrary, according to Baumgarten, the obscure representation is part of a whole, 
a sum [complexus]; a totality which, in its very own introversion and concealment – and 
hence obscurity – nonetheless exists as the original ground (i.e., the fundament) of all that 
is clear in the human soul; so much so, that upon depicting this new cartography of the 
soul, Baumgarten adduces, §514, that “A sum of representations in the soul is a complete 
representation” (ibid.), “and the sum of the obscure representations amid these is the field 
10 That is to say: though Baumgarten was to discern new potentialities in obscure representations, he did believe 
that it was the destination of obscure representations to be clear, and that no clear thinking could come from 
obscure representations (§ 510). This, however, did not contradict the fact that obscure representations are at 
the origin of clear representations, and hence play an important role in human cognition, which is precisely that 
which is stated in §§ 511 and 514. 
11 All citations, not only Baumgarten’s, but also from other authors, will be presented in the traditional manner 
(Abbreviation of work, Volume of work, number of page(s)). The abbreviation of each work cited finds cor-
respondence in the final bibliographical section. All citations have been translated from their original Latin 
language into English, and included in their Latin original only in case of special necessity. All citations are of 
my own translation, and therefore my own responsibility.
12 “Sunt in anima perceptiones obscurae (§ 510). Harum complexus FUNDUS ANIMAE dicitur.” (Met.: 118).
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of obscurity (darkness): this is the ground of the soul” (id.: 119) (or, as Baumgarten will 
then describe it, in § 518, “regnum tenebrarum” (id.: 120)). And hence, if not immediately 
as such, then at least indirectly, through their real effects, Baumgarten elevates obscure or 
sensible representations, as a whole, to the singular condition of an object of consciousness: 
an object of consciousness so important, that from it arises the whole of human imagination 
[Einbildung] and hence the whole of human knowledge – an apparent nuance, but which 
indeed meant a true revolution in the study of the topic, one through which obscure repre-
sentations, and also sensibility, transcend their previous subalternate role in the theory of 
consciousness, and acquire a primordial, for grounding role13 not only amid the latter, but 
also amid the theory of human representation.
Let us then, in Sections III-V of this article, attempt to think the contours of such a 
revolution in the topic of obscure representations, as it is fragmentarily presented by Baum-
garten in the aforementioned works; and let us try to discern that which, in such a tripartite 
presentation of the topic, may contribute towards understanding the topic’s new, superior 
condition from the 18th century onwards.
III. The position of obscure representations within the inferior power of cognition, and 
within Empirical Psychology. The aesthetic nature of obscure representations
According to Baumgarten, obscure representations exist; they are real and as such exert 
grounding influence on clear representations and on the human soul, and hence have a 
prime position in the ladder of the formation of ideas of cognition. That is, they have an 
inaugural position in a ladder which departs from the senses and passes through memory, 
the faculty of imagination, wit, genius and at last the understanding and reason, the ladder 
of the process of human imagination [Einbildung]. And hence, it is no mere chance that 1) 
in the Metaphysik, the paragraphs on obscure representations (§§ 510-533) directly precede 
those on sensibility (§§ 534-556), on fantasy (§§ 557-571), on memory (§§ 579-588) and 
the faculty of poetizing (§§ 589-594), or that, in the Ästhetik, they are directly related not 
only to the latter, but also to wit or genius; or even that, in the “Meditationes”, obscure 
representations are considered as a topic of great importance to poetry. Furthermore, it 
can be no mere coincidence 2) that in the Metaphysik, obscure representations are gathe-
red under a section entitled “Facultas cogniscitiva inferior” (“Of the inferior power of 
cognition”), and that 3) this latter section is included in a chapter entitled “The Empirical 
Psychology”. For that is, according to Baumgarten, the position of obscure representations 
within the human spirit; namely, that, as the ground of the soul, they are at the fundament 
of the process of human imagination.
However, this double framework of the position of obscure representations – namely, 
as an element of the inferior power of human cognition (i.e., as a founding member in the 
13 This is why, along with Baumgarten, we must stress that obscurity, that is, obscure representations are not at all 
confused clarity, that is, clear-confused representations. Yet, Baumgarten suggests, due to their fundamental, 
grounding character, the first ones are at the origin of the latter, as well as of distinct ones; which is why clear-
confused representations are clear-confused. And hence, as shall be proved, what obscure representations and 
clear-confused representations have is a veiled, creative, organic connection amid their visible, dull, mechanical 
difference (See Annotation 16).
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process of human imagination), and as a topic of empirical psychology – tells us something 
more about Baumgarten’s real vision of the topic. Let us then see what this something more 
may be, and how each of these frameworks may help us discern it.
Now, the relation between obscure representations and empirical psychology seems to 
be evident, and it is in itself symbolic of the new-found importance of such representations. 
By empirical psychology understood Baumgarten that special part of metaphysics which, 
departing from real phenomena (that is, pro positu corporis), attempts to prove the intellec-
tual reality of the soul. Obscure representations, as real representations, can therefore help 
prove the intellectual reality of the soul; precisely due to this are they summoned as such in 
the Metaphysik. One could say, then, that as real representations and as an integrating part of 
empirical psychology – as the ground of the soul – obscure representations can and should, 
regardless of their fragmentary character, help explain the process of realization of human 
representations, or further still the procedure of other faculties, even the understanding and 
reason, in their contribution towards the birth of human ideas. And provided that they are 
held in the special point of view proposed by Baumgarten, as approached in section II of 
this article, they may help cognize the relation between body and soul. This much is ack-
nowledged by Baumgarten himself, when he states, § 512: “From the position of my body 
in this world may be acknowledged why I represent these things more clearly, those things 
more obscurely, others more distinctly, that is: My representations are directed according to 
the position of my body in this world” (Met.: 118).
As to the relation between obscure representations and the inferior power of cognition, 
this is equally evident – and yet, even more revealing of the new functions and potentiali-
ties of obscure representations. For the inferior power of cognition is surely inferior; but, 
despite being inferior, it is first and foremost a power of cognition; and hence, to this pro-
perty – cognition – must be entitled obscure representations, as the founding form of human 
knowledge, as well as the remaining inferior imaginative capacities, such as genius, wit, the 
faculty of imagination, which are here repercussions of obscure representations. And this, 
on its own, could surely stand for the integration of obscure representations in the inferior 
power of cognition in general. But such an integration requires a whole transformation; it 
requires the inclusion of the product of obscure representations among such imaginative 
capacities, and hence not just a casual, but a powerful influence of obscure representations 
upon such capacities, and vice versa; in a word, such an integration requires not only a new 
relation between obscure representations and the inferior power of cognition, but, in a word, 
a whole new redisposition of the inferior power of cognition in general, as brought about 
by the acknowledgment of the founding existence of obscure representations. A whole new 
redisposition which not only means that sensible representations must have a real, and more 
than contingent relation with memory, the faculty of imagination, wit, but also that all these 
inferior capacities – and especially obscure representations, due to their original position – 
must have a real, and more than contingent connection with sensibility; in such a way that, 
according to Baumgarten, obscure representations are indeed a link – the first, and yet the 
last link – between sensibility and the inferior powers of the spirit, thereby forging between 
the former and the latter different relations, according to the use the spirit does of them.
Now, this is not the occasion to detail such relations, nor to try to ascertain how the 
representative human being can put them to use. But one thing must be said, at least regar-
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ding their general procedure: because these relations promoted by obscure representations 
take place within the inferior power of cognition and have such a close relation with sen-
sibility; because they, as it seems, so actively involve and reconfigure all the capacities 
which integrate the inferior power of cognition; and because, as such, in their intimate con-
nection with the sensible, these relations have their due place under empirical psychology, 
then such relations cannot be of a logical or mechanical order, which are reserved for the 
superior spheres of human knowledge (and this, despite the place ascribed to them in the 
Metaphysik). Quite on the contrary, this double position of obscure representations, and 
especially the relations they forge – in a word, all about them – is according to Baumgarten 
of an aesthetic (for sensible) order; and hence, such relations must reveal a whole different 
source and a whole different sense, a whole different purpose, and hence a whole different 
vision of obscure representations as an aesthetic instrument of cognition. This, this affir-
mation of the aesthetic character of obscure representations, and their akin function within 
human knowledge in general, is that which Baumgarten brings to light through the previous 
positioning of the topic of obscure representations within the inferior power of cognition 
and empirical psychology. This, then, is the something new Baumgarten brings to question 
through such a double framework of the topic.
We, in turn, bring this to word under the form of a double conclusion:
First, that, according to Baumgarten, obscure representations, as the ground of the soul, 
are at the root of the inferior power of cognition, between sensibility and soul, between the 
senses and the remaining inferior powers of the soul, thereby establishing between both, 
and also between the superior facultiesof cognition, a linking relation: a link of an aesthe-
tic nature. And hence, we assume, side by side with Baumgarten, that despite the inherent 
negativity often tributed to obscure representations, there might be possible to discern in this 
new aesthetic relation some sort of positivity and even benefit from such representations to 
the superior spheres of the human spirit.
Second, that, if this, namely, this aesthetic positivity of obscure representations, is to be 
proved right, then such a conviction is so contrary to the previous history of the topic, that 
Baumgarten must be seen not only as the philosopher who until then most poignantly had 
reconsidered the influence of wit, the faculty of imagination, genius, and now also obscure 
representations, on the human soul; but also as the philosopher who first inscribes obscure 
representations as a valid element in the inferior power of cognition, as well as the inferior 
power of cognition itself, as a science, in the realm of Aesthetics (which is to say, within 
empirical psychology). It remains to be seen how Baumgarten does this, in sections IV and 
V of this article.
IV. The problem of the truth of obscure representations: between the necessary interio-
rization and the necessary exteriorization of the latter
Upon inquiring the Ästhetik (1750-1758), to which obscure representations now seem 
to be connected, no new indications on the new relations, nor on the new aesthetic status 
of obscure representations is to be found; and not even upon inquiring the rest of the Meta-
physik (1739) does one find clear indicators on this, and the matter seems to be confined to 
the aforementioned paragraphs. However, and despite our knowing that Baumgarten would 
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never come to expressly (or fully) answer this question, there are certainly veiled signs, of 
not very difficult reconstruction, which may allow us to ascertain the philosopher’s definitive 
position on the aestheticity of obscure representations.
One of those signs, indeed one of the most evident, arises still in §521 of the Metaphysik, 
where, according to Baumgarten: “An indistinct representation is called sensible. Hence, 
the force of my soul presentifies sensible representations through the inferior power of 
cognition” (Met.: 120).
Obscure representations, the ground of the soul, Baumgarten says, are “sensible represen-
tations” – and if they are so it is due to reasons which are known to us: first, because they are 
between the rude senses and the remaining inferior powers of cognition, which contact with 
the understanding and reason; here residing their hybridity, their unconscious consciousness, 
inasmuch as they are indeed already representations – but still sensible (“indistinct repre-
sentations” (id.). Second, because, due to the same reason, in obscure representations there 
is still a trace of the sensible object which originated them (otherwise, such representations 
would not be held as such, rather as distinct), but also, and notwithstanding this, already a 
double tendency for creativity and for intellectuality: for the “presentification” of the sen-
sible through the “force of my soul” (ibid.) (otherwise, they would not be representations, 
nor would they deal with and have place among other faculties, nor would they originate 
there should be “other representations). These reasons are as such unequivocal, and more 
than sufficient to ascribe sensibility to obscure representations, and obscurity to the sensible.
Now, in our view, Baumgarten’s two abovementioned, quite hybrid reasons of being of 
indistinct representations, are at the basis of the philosopher’s new conception of the topic. 
This conception, which is likewise double, must therefore unfold as the natural development 
of said two reasons – a development which we shall now attempt to reenact.
The first reason of being of obscure representations is, quite simply, the truth of their 
sensibility. For obscure representations are not sensible just because they are sensible, and 
must remain sensible; and just because they are obscure, and in plain sight fragmentary and 
even apparently illusory, that does not presuppose that, upon their transition to other facul-
ties, such as the faculty of imagination, wit, memory, these faculties have to purify, or clarify 
obscure representations in order to extract some use from them and thus present them to the 
understanding. No; quite on the contrary, Baumgarten says, although this is bound to hap-
pen, before this, obscure representations already stand on their own and have truth in them, 
because they are sensible, because in them still lies the sensation of the object which gave 
them being. And this because our sensations, Baumgarten adds, are that which is “truest in 
the world” (see Met.: 128, § 546) and no sensation is endowed with the capacity to deceive 
our spirit – that capacity must rather be attributed to the faculty of judgment itself, and the 
judgments it renders: a Leibnizian notion14 which would be very dear to Kant, and upon 
which the latter would base his apology of sensibility15. Now this, in short, must mean that 
that which is sensible, is true; and that which is not sensible, is untrue. And hence, if this 
is so, then that which most immediately borders with sensations – precisely the obscure, 
14 See Leibniz, G. W., “Discours de metaphysique”, Section 14 (BLA: 167-168).
15 See the first etches of Kant’s apology of sensibility in his Lectures on Anthropology (AA 25.2: 886-892 e AA 
25.2: 1228-1233). 
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or sensible representations – must still possess in high degree this truth of sensations; a 
truth which obscure representations feel naturally inclined to preserve, for, as it seems, they 
cannot gain from their transition to other faculties, rather seem to have to lose in truth upon 
contacting with them, and this, the more they draw away from original sensations, and their 
real truth, and closer to the true source of possible error, the faculty of judgment.
As to the second reason of being of obscure representations, it has to do with their need 
for intellectuality. For, according to Baumgarten, if there is one thing that we have to admit 
with regard to obscure representations, it is that they are no longer sensations – rather they 
are representations of sensations – and that hence, despite their ground of truth, they are 
nonetheless concealment of truth. And why is this? Because even though, due to their proxi-
mity to truth, due to their most inferior and hence original position, obscure representations 
do contain in themselves, in nuce, truth, in their appearance, however, the fact that they are 
in no way sensations will be forever marked in them – and if they are not sensations, they 
are already representations, and if they are representations, even though obscure ones, then, 
although their sensible truth has to lose in intensity upon contacting with other faculties, 
their intellectual clarification notwithstanding demands that they become external: to be pre-
sentified by the force of the soul. Indeed, Baumgarten adds with this regard, it is not only a 
natural tendency of obscure representations, but it must be the wish of their owner that such 
representations come to be, or enable distinct and clear ones; namely, that obscure represen-
tations move on to another field, another kingdom, naturally opposed to that of obscurity: 
“the field of clarity (of light)” (Met.: 119), the “regnum lucis” (id.: 120), which is greater 
than its antipode and which “contains in itself the fields of confusion, of distinctness and of 
completeness” (id.: 119). And this, of course, not only because obscure representations need 
to be clarified – which nonetheless is true; or because the greater field of light is superior 
and should always seek to suppress the obscure one – which is also true to Baumgarten; 
but because, for the philosopher, there is in obscure representations a second, equally strong 
tendency, namely, a propensity for exteriorization: a propensity to contact with all other 
faculties, inferior and superior, of the human faculty of imagination, so as to render evident 
and clear what is obscure in such representations, the obscure truth they convey; which in 
short means; a tendency of intellectualization, a tendency of revelation of truth, which also 
is to be ascribed to obscure representations.
Now, these two reasons correspond to two natural propensities of sensible representa-
tions, and if seen together, these two propensities signify two different things. Namely, on 
the one hand, obscure representations reveal truth, which is transmitted by sensation, and 
this truth is, so to say, the first and yet most obscure representation we make of objects and 
ourselves. In this truth must reside, then, a secret about us and objects, and the sensible key 
on the manner how representations traverse our inferior and superior faculties of cognition, 
and on the very consciousness which we have of them and of ourselves, must be in obscure 
representations. On the other hand, Baumgarten adds, there is in sensible representations 
concealment of truth; for they are not sensations, rather representations, and hence it is 
through the aforementioned path, through the inferior and superior faculties of cognition, 
and the exposition of the veiled truth to the eyes of reason, that this truth may come to be 
known and held as such – as truth. For, according to Baumgarten, “True cognition is reality, 
its contrary, no cognition or lack of cognition, is ignorance, and apparent cognition or error 
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are negations” (Metaphysik: 7). However – and to resume the previous words – this cons-
titutes a problem; and the problem is that what these two different, yet simultaneous visions 
of obscure representations signify is something apparently contradictory – and that due to 
their simultaneity. For if, on the one hand, it is their introversion, their self-confinement, 
as possible sensation, which guarantees the obscure representation the safekeep of its truth, 
however, it is its exteriorization and clarification, its distancing itself from the sensation, 
which enables it to validate that truth; for, as sensible representations, obscure representa-
tions are not yet intellectual representations and hence they still lack a certain connection 
to knowledge, as that of wit, genius or taste, or the judgments of the understanding or the 
ideas of reason.
That is, in itself the obscure representation may have something of truth (wahr), but 
until it exteriorizes itself and submits to the action of the remaining faculties, it is not yet 
knowledge as such; and yet, upon exteriorizing itself and attempting to bring to light all that 
is true in it, the obscure representation loses in sensibility and in truth, despite definitively 
coming to be knowledge. And hence, one could almost say that, due to this new acknowledg-
ment of its importance, and its subsequent new status in the theory of consciousness – which 
is real and must be credited to Baumgarten – the topic of obscure representations faces in the 
same author, and for posterity, a complex problem: that, in order to be true, obscure repre-
sentations cannot be cognizable, and in order to be cognizable, obscure representations can 
no longer be true. A problem which is something as a final trace of the previous skeptical 
historical course of obscure representations, but also a first hint towards the final revolution 
of the topic, of other akin topics, in a word, of the whole inferior power of cognition.
V. The chiaroscuro of obscure representations: their sfumato between unconscious and 
conscious poetry
The dilemma of obscure representations, which is in truth that of a hardly soluble chia-
roscuro, would not be neglected by Baumgarten. The author provides us with a possible 
solution for it, curiously enough, prior to the Metaphysik and the Ästhetik. That solution ari-
ses in the “Meditationes philosophicae de Nunullis ad poema pertinentibus” (1735), where, 
with regard to sensible representations, it is said that
Representations which were acquired through the inferior part of the power of cogni-
tion are to be designated as [SENSIBLE]. Because the aspiration, as long as it stems 
from a confused representation of good, is designated as sensible, and because a con-
fused representation, along with an obscure one, are acquired through the inferior part 
of the faculty of cognition, so can we apply this same name also to representations 
themselves, so that one may distinguish them from those which are in conformity 
with the understanding and are in all possible degrees distinct” (Med.: 9, § III).
The dilemma is well stressed here; namely, the inferior part of the faculty of cognition 
“acquires”, seizes representations, representations which, because they are transmitted by 
sensibility, are sensible (“SINNLICH”), and are to be treasured as such; but even though they 
have to be thus differentiated from those representations which are in conformity with the 
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understanding (“verstandesmäβigen”) – the distinct ones – however, in sensible representa-
tions there must also be a propensity for intellectuality, to be distinct, and hence to relinquish 
all obscurity; for, indeed, obscure representations are for Baumgarten the foundation of the 
soul, and hence they are at the origin of both distinct and indistinct representations. And 
so is once again expounded our dilemma: obscure representations must oscillate between 
their necessary sensibility, the guardian of their truth, and their necessary de-sensibilization 
among the inferior powers of cognition and on its path to the understanding: obscure repre-
sentations which, in a word, to be scuro, cannot be chiaro, and to be chiaro, cannot be scuro.
This modulation, however – it is our view – cannot be seen simply in black and white, 
and behind it lurks a last chromatic nuance worth mentioning. Namely, even though we 
know that such a contradiction takes place in one and the same sensible representation, 
however, it takes place in two different planes of the latter, that of its obscurity and that of 
its clarity: in other words, an actual plane, that of their necessary existence, where sensible 
representations are indeed obscure and confusing to the understanding, but clear to the 
sensibility, and another plane, so to say, a potential, or latent plane, that of their necessary 
non-existence (intellectualization), where sensible representations are clear to the unders-
tanding but obscure to the sensibility, according to which sensible representations, though 
rendered clear, actually lose in truth. The latter, Baumgarten designates them as “clear-
confused” (“klar-verworren”) representations, which are not obscure representations, and 
are not clear representations – and yet are linked through an internal connection, at least 
in terms of their organic evolution16. Now, what this means, Baumgarten concludes, is that 
this generates hybridity, a chromatic undefinition of such sensible representations, since 
the exteriorization of obscure representations signifies their realization, but dissimulation, 
and their interiorization signifies their preservation, but also concealment. And so, sensible 
representations are never merely obscure but are already also clear, and are never merely 
clear, but still also obscure: “sensible representations [can] be obscure or clear” (Med.: 13, § 
XII), depending on the point of view from which one considers them. For, from one point of 
view, obscure, and yet clear representations (“klar-verworren”) lose their true clarity as they 
progress in their supposed clarity – but are actually rendered obscure – and from a second 
point of view, distinct representations, which hold the truth over obscure representations, do 
not truly hold it, for they have already lost it – and therefore they are a point of no return, 
the final de-sensibilization for obscure representations.
And hence, as it seems, until a point of view may be found according to which these 
two extremes of the chiaroscuro of human representativeness are encompassed; that is, a 
point of view according to which obscure sensible representations may convey their true 
clarity, which they indeed possess, to clear sensible representations, in such a way that the 
obscurity, which the latter do indeed possess, may not conceal that truth; in a word, a point 
of view according to which obscure representations may transmit what is positive – positively 
illogical, aesthetic – in them; until such a point of view is gained, there will be no end to 
contradiction, and the problem of obscure representations shall remain what it always was 
throughout its history – a problem of negativity.
16 See Annotation 13.
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Now, according to Baumgarten, such a special perspective of things, the much sought 
sfumato between the chiaro and the scuro of obscure and/or clear sensible representations is 
possible – and it springs to its inquirer’s eyes not in the moment when one forces himself to 
suppress the chiaro, or the scuro, from sensible representations. That is, the solution arises 
not in the moment when he forces the necessary suppression between obscurity and clarity 
either in one extreme point of sensibility – that of the existence of the obscure representation 
– or in the other extreme point of sensibility – that of the non-existence of the latter. For, if 
devoid of one, obscure representations would forever remain caged in themselves; if devoid 
of the other, obscure representations would once and for all disappear, and hence be sense-
less. Quite on the contrary, the sfumato arises when one understands the previous problem, 
and its greatest difficulty, the simultaneous duality of the latter, not as such, but precisely 
as that which may be a certain disposition, a certain conception of sensible representations 
which, instead of seeing the contradiction as a problem, rather sees it, in sfumato, as its 
solution. And that occurs through a view of sensible representations, both obscure and clear, 
as originally poetic representations; and, on the other hand, a counter-view of non-sensible as 
rigorously non-poetic representations. Something which Baumgarten expounds as follows: 
“Sensible representations are constituents of a poem, and hence poetic. But because sensible 
representations may be obscure or clear, so are obscure and clear representations poetic” 
(Med.: 15; § XIV). To which he adds: “Distinct representations, complete, adequate, throug-
hout profound representations, are not sensible, and hence they are not poetic” (id.).
According to Baumgarten, then, there is a difference between obscure and distinct repre-
sentations, which is a difference between eminently poetic and non-poetic representations; 
and this because these are the two extremes of the arch of the human imaginative (bildend) 
process; that is, because, just as obscure representations are the ground of the soul, so are the 
distinct ones, or clear ideas, the ceiling of the latter. But if one is dealing here with antipodes, 
but, as was concluded above, with antipodes whose different hues are sometimes mixed, to 
the point that the obscurity of sensible representations is their clarity, and their clarity also 
their obscurity, then, either the solution resides in a way of conceiving the problem as was 
that previous to Baumgarten, or as is that of Baumgarten himself. That is, either the solution 
is with Baumgarten’s predecessors, who saw in obscure representations a fabrication of the 
fancy, or an at least doubtful reality, or even something which, despite its existence, could 
never be reported to the superior spheres of the soul; who saw in obscure representations, 
in wit, in genius, even in the faculty of imagination, mere forces of the spirit, at the service 
of the faculty of the understanding; who, in a word, looked down upon the inferior power 
of cognition, taking it solely as inferior, and deemed it, along with aesthetics, as something 
impossible to bring to the condition of a science. Or the solution is with Baumgarten, who 
sees in sensibility, clear or obscure, sheer poeticity, and in the absence of this, sheer non-
poeticity; Baumgarten who first discerns in obscure representations not only something 
existent, but also something [such poeticity] capable of influencing the other faculties of the 
spirit, and also and especially the superior amongst these; Baumgarten who saw in obscure 
representations, as well as in other capacities, true faculties of the spirit, surely inferior, but 
indeed necessary to the understanding; in short, Baumgarten who was the first to elevate the 
inferior power of cognition to the theoretical level of the superior one, which would elevate 
its study to the condition of a science, Aesthetics.
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Now, the first one sees in such inferior capacities, and especially in obscure representa-
tions, the previous dilemma, and he cannot, nor does he want to solve it; for, according to 
him, there is no truth, nor any kind of clarity, to be drawn from the sensibility of obscure 
representations. And even if from these, or from the treatment that is given to obscure repre-
sentations by such capacities, there should arise something valid for the understanding, its 
very acceptance by the latter presupposes that the obscure representation ceases to be – and 
that the dilemma were undone by means of violence. For sensibility is surely poeticity: but 
poetry is perhaps the stage of the vivification or realization of obscure representations, but 
not of the manifestation of any fact of a scientific validity, a true fact; and hence, in his 
view, the dilemma is so obvious that he prefers to avoid it altogether: for him, the chiaros-
curo does not even exist, for in no way can darkness come to be light without ceasing to be 
darkness, and vice versa.
But the second one – Baumgarten – sees this question, all of it, somewhat differently. 
According to him, sensibility is indeed poeticity, and this is not only due to the fact that 
poetic rhymes with original, or only because, as it seems, there might be some sort of 
affinity between obscure representations and poetry. No. For, indeed, the poetic, or sensi-
ble, is original; and indeed, there is between obscure representations and poetry a strong 
connection. But when he states that sensible is poetic, Baumgarten rather wishes to refer 
to the eminently operational, creative, generative – po(i)etic – nature which lies in obscure 
representations; a nature which precisely does not create or generate contingently, rather 
creates purposefully, for it is originally assisted by a truth which pulses in them: a truth 
which, by inspiring memory, the faculty of imagination, wit, so to say enlivens them and 
exponentiates their best creative capacities. And likewise, by stating that between obscure 
representations and poetry there is a connection, Baumgarten means to signify not just any 
connection, nor a remote, casual connection, rather that obscure sensible representations, 
because they are in their essence clear, are themselves the commencement of the process 
of poetic composition, living poetry as such, which is to be adorned, intellectualized, in 
a word, humanized by the inferior and superior faculties of the soul, under the form of 
conscious poetry (poetry by words) – clear sensible representations. Hence, clear sensible 
representations, because they are in their essence also obscure, are in turn the ideal coming 
to be of obscure sensible representations, the conclusion of the process of poetic composi-
tion. And hence, sensibility is poeticity because obscure representations, all the faculties of 
the spirit, the very imaginative process and its final result as a science, the Aesthetics: all 
these are more or less po(i)etic: a creative moment to which only distinct representations, 
that is, the eminently logic, philosophical manner of conceiving the problem of obscure 
representations, can put an end.
Now, how to conceive, one last time, the dilemma of obscure representations – now, at 
last, as a po(i)etic problem? We reiterate: according to our view of the problem in Baum-
garten, the solution for this problem is not its suppression, but precisely its acceptance: the 
notion that obscure representations hold a veiled truth, and that this has to be safeguarded; 
but that, at the same time, obscure representations have a propensity to render that truth 
cognizable, which leads them to extinction. Now, this was surely problematic for those 
who saw in this an insoluble dilemma. But the kern of the dilemma is precisely in its pre-
servation, which is its solution. For if sensible representations are both obscure and clear; 
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if obscure representations become clear, and clear representations are also obscure, that 
is, sensible; and if both are truly distinguished not between themselves, but from distinct, 
non-sensible, non-poetic representations, then two aspects must be underscored. On the 
one hand, this means that between the obscurity and the clarity of sensible representations 
there is now a non-conflictual circularity – which is achieved precisely due to the fact that 
both are poetic, and because it is the essence of poetry to expose truth through metaphors 
(obscure sensible representations = unconscious poetry; clear sensible representations = 
conscious poetry). On the other hand, this means that, where there was before conflict, 
namely, in the transition from the obscure, or the clear-confused, to the distinct, that no 
longer takes place, due to the very poeticity (clarity-confusion) of the representations in 
question, which is also at the origin of distinct representations, and hence, even if veiled, 
at their consummation.
To put it differently, what does this mean? First of all, that the clarity and obscurity of 
the message of obscure representations is unified, because it is poetic; and so, the fact that 
what is obscure – truth – is already representation, does not unfavorably influence clarity; 
and this because it is proper to poetry and its metaphors to lend the representation the 
appearance, the simulacrum of truth, of the original sensation. Secondly, this means that the 
difficult transition – the de-sensibilization – of such representations to the superior faculties 
of cognition, must indeed happen. But because it once again takes place through poetry, 
then, exceptionally, the faculty of judgment is forced to accept such obscure-clarity (sfu-
mato); and by doing so, the dilemma disappears, for here, the sensible character of obscure 
representations is considered not as that which separates the inferior and superior faculties 
of the spirit, but as that which also unites them; and hence, because it is not forcefully silen-
ced, rather is at the origin of something, the sensibility of such representations never truly 
dies, and as poetry, or as metaphor, it perpetuates the effect and the truth of the obscure 
representation. This is how obscure representations reappear in their greatest truth, and with 
them the objects that gave them being; but above all, this is how the understanding itself 
is compensated with new truths and hence is expanded – a conclusion which we shall see 
often reiterated in another reader of Baumgarten, and which shall be at the heart of another 
revolution of the inferior powers of cognition17.
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